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One of the most challenging resource allocation tasks for managers is to balance
short-termand long-termproducts development initiatives, since exploitative (i.e.,
short-termfocused) resourceallocationpatternspreventmanagers fromrecognizing
the existence or significance of exploratory (i.e., long-term focused) opportunities.
Recent researchonorganizational ambidexteritypromises thepotential to overcome
this trade-off relationship, but they lack clear indications concerning the mix of
exploitationandexploration thatwould result inanoptimaldegreeof ambidexterity.
Through the analysis of a unique data set on development resource allocation
patterns for 231 new pharmaceutical products, as well as on the economic value of
thoseproducts,we showthatpharmaceutical companies realize ahigher exploration
degree of valuableness and hence an optimal level of ambidexterity by allocating
roughly 1.5 times more development resources to exploitative products than to
exploratory ones.
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ethical pharmaceutical companies, because the
quickly changing competitive situation requires
both continuous adjustments to current products
and radically new break-through products. The
former calls for firms to extensively exploit
libraries of existing chemical entities, whereas
the latter requires that firms engage in a highly
uncertain and lengthy exploration for novel NCEs
(new chemical entities). This leads to our basic
research question of what is the optimal balance
between exploitative and exploratory product
development activities for firms?
One of the most notable aspects of today’s
ethical pharmaceutical industry is increased
pressure on firms from competition on price and
time to market (Pisano & Rossi, 1994).
Pharmaceutical firms apply counter pressure to
the market through development of pipelines of
potential pharmaceutical drugs. These pipelines
of potential pharmaceutical drugs consist of
derivatives of existing chemical entities and
pipelines that are based on new chemical entities
(NCE).An example of a pharmaceutical drug that
came from a new chemical entity is Eli Lilly’s
Since the seminal articles by Teece (1982) and
Wernerfelt (1984), scholars argue that firm
idiosyncratic “resources” are key determinants
of firm performance and competitive advantage.
Firmsarebundle of resources,and those resources
per se, as well as how they are combined and
deployed, significantly affect firm performance.
Consequently, decisions on resource allocation
should be a core element of strategic thinking in
managing business organizations.
One of the most challenging resource
allocation tasks for managers is to balance short-
term and long-term products development
initiatives. As classic studies on the trade-off
relationshipbetweenexploitationandexploration
(Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991) suggest,
scholars emphasize that too exploitative (i.e.,
short-term focused) resource allocation patterns
prevent managers to recognize the existence or
significance of particular exploratory (i.e., long-
term focused) opportunities (Benner & Tushman,
2002; Christensen & Bower, 1996; Gilbert, 2005;
Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981).
This is particularly problematic for global
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the potential of identified innovation
opportunities (Anderson & Tushman,2001).Most
major ethical pharmaceutical companies do not
follow either a pure exploitation or pure
exploration strategy, but attempt to mix their
product development activities. These firms are
engaging in an ambidextrous strategy in order
to maintain a pipeline that provides for both
current and future market competition.
Recent advances in our understanding of
ambidextrous organizations (Adler,Goldoftas,&
Levine, 1999; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; He &
Wong, 2004; Kane & Alavi, 2007; Lavie &
Rosenkopf, 2006; Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling,& Veiga,
2006; Sheremata, 2000; Siggelkow & Levinthal,
2003; Tushman & O’Reily, 1996; Tushman,
Anderson, & O’Reily, 1997; Wang & Li, 2008)
provide potential solutions for this dilemma.
Organizations can be ambidextrous through such
levers as managerial interventions (Tushman,
Anderson,& O’Reily, 1997),unique organizational
contexts (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004), or top
management team’s behavioral integration
(Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling, & Veiga, 2006) in that
they can exploit, as well as explore at the same
time.
Unfortunately, the work of these scholars has
opened an important question that has yet to be
clarified; that is, what is the optimal balance of
resource allocation between exploitative and
exploratory initiatives. Considering the fact that
most organizations pursue both exploitation and
exploration to a certain extent (i.e., perfectly
exploitative or exploratory resource allocation is
unrealistic), this lack of understanding on the
optimal resource allocation is problematic. This
is because although managers know pursuing
both exploitation and exploration is important
for ensuring favorable innovation performance,
it is unclear whether they should increase or
decrease resources allocated to exploitative (or,
exploratory) initiatives. Therefore, as we noted
above, our primary research question is what is
the optimal balance of resource allocation
between exploitative and exploratory initiatives.
By answering this question, we will make more
explicit a guidelinebywhichmanagers canadjust
their current resource allocation between
exploitative and exploratory pharmaceutical
product development initiatives and develop an
optimal level of ambidexterity in product
development activities.
Research on ambidextrous organizations also
predominantly focuses on one aspect of
performance benefits earned by ambidextrous
organizations,whileneglectinganother important
aspect.More specifically,previous research focused
Prozac,while its descendents, such as Sarafem is
anexampleofaderivative fromthesamechemical
entity called fluoxetine. Initially, fluoxetine was
successfully developed as an anti-depressant
(Prozac), and later, Eli Lilly redeveloped it for a
different indication of premenstrual dysphoric
disorder (Sarafem)uponProzac’spatent expiration.
Often in addressing the pressure,
pharmaceutical firms exploit their core
competencies by reusing existing chemical
entities so that they can quickly launch
incrementally new products that are targeted to
an existing market. However, too much reliance
on exploitation erodes a firm’s capability to
develop radically new break-through products
based on NCEs. One of the unintended
consequences of an over reliance on exploitation
is that a firm’s pipelines grow obsolete and shrink
in number due to insufficient exploration for
NCEs.This would threaten the long-term survival
of the firm unless it found an outside source for
NCEs. It could be argued that firms that follow a
generic drug strategy are examples of a pure
exploitation strategy in that 100 percent of these
firms’ products come from existing chemical
entities and these firms are dependant on other
ethical pharmaceutical companies to develop
NCEs.
When, on the other hand, firms excessively
explore for NCEs, they are likely to be quickly out-
competed in the short-term due to not having
enough pharmaceutical drugs available for the
current market. This would result in the firm
gradually be starved of resources, such as cash,
thus, threatening sustainable development of
identified NCEs which would become marketable
in the future. This situation of following a pure
exploration strategy is most common in
entrepreneurial start-up firms that may be
devoting 100 percent of their resources towards
some NCE in the hope that it will become a
blockbuster drug. These firms must pay close
attention to their“burn rate”of current resources,
and these must be refreshed from alternative
sources such as venture capital markets.
In other words, only through an appropriate
balance between exploitation and exploration
canpharmaceutical companies sustain their value
creation activities of developing innovative new
products, since exploitation and exploration
inherently preclude each other. Consequently, it
is critical to the survival of firms that they find a
balance between exploitation and exploration
that results in an optimal level of ambidexterity
and avoid being doomed to either over-exploit
at the riskof losingmajor innovationopportunities
(Levitt&March,1988),or over-explorenot fulfilling
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to crowdout exploration.Asorganizations engage
in more exploitative activities they would
subsequently generate less exploratory activities
(Abernathy, 1978; Argyris & Schon, 1978; Benner
& Tushman, 2002; Henderson & Clark, 1990;
Leonard-Barton, 1992; Levinthal & March, 1993;
Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Sull, 1999; Sorensen &
Stuart, 2000). Although not explicitly stated in
these studies, there is an implicit assumption that
this is a one for one trade-off, with each unit of
exploitative activity reducing exploratory activity
by one unit.
The fundamental assumption for this
argument is that exploitation requiresdistinctively
different cognitive and behavioral patterns from
exploration (Anderson & Tushman, 2001).
Exploitation is usually related to improvements,
increasedefficiencyand incremental adjustments,
while exploration is closely linked with variety
generation, distinctly new possibilities, distant
search,and radical or revolutionarychange (March,
1991). Therefore,although both of these activities
are required for long-term organizational
adaptation, organizations either over-exploit at
the risk of losing major change opportunities
(Levitt&March,1988),or over-explorenot fulfilling
the efficiency increase potential of an innovation
(Anderson & Tushman, 2001).
It is further asserted that the proportion of
over-exploitative or over-exploratory activity in
an organization is not equally valued. Initiatives
associated with exploitation are preferentially
selected by organizations, since they involve less
risk, and promise more certain benefit in the
shorter-term. Exploitation is more cognitively
favored by managers,and from a behavioral point
of view, fits better into the existing standard
operatingprocedures. Consequently,organizations
tend to engage in more exploitative activity than
exploratory activity.
As is clearly shown in the above arguments,
those who see a substitutional relationship
between exploitation and exploration focus on
the resource allocation trade-off between
exploitation and exploration.The more resources
anorganizationallocates to exploitativeactivities,
the less the organization is motivated to allocate
resources to exploratory ones, resulting in fewer
exploratory achievements compared to
exploitative ones. In other words, exploitation
hinders an organization’s ability to engage in
exploration. This challenge confronting
organizations and how organizations attempt to
answer the challenge is critical toboth their short-
term and long-term survival. We next turn our
attention to research that examines how
organizations are confronting this challenge.
on aspects of quantitative growth that are less
directly a measure of an innovation’s economic
value and incorporate all aspects of the business
value chain activities that support an innovation,
as well as competitive factors that affect the price
of an innovation in the market. Measures such
as sales increase (He & Wong, 2004), growth in
sales and market share (Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling,
&Veiga,2006),profitability (Knott,2002;Lubatkin,
Simsek, Ling, & Veiga, 2006), or Tobin’s q (Wang
& Li, 2008) reflect the supporting activities of
marketing, financing and distributing the
innovation as well as the value of the innovation
itself. On the other hand, a more direct measure
of new value creation, or exploration degree of
valuablenesshasbeen rarely emphasized,because
of thedifficulty inobtaining suchdirectmeasures.
So, our second research question is whether
organizational ambidexterity is beneficial for
new value creation at the level of the
pharmaceutical drug itself.
One of the main stumbling blocks to
generating a more detailed understanding of the
optimal balance between exploitation and
exploration is the difficulty in obtaining fine-
grained data that can objectively operationalize
these constructs.The lack of studies on the source
of more valuable exploratory innovation is also
ascribed to thedifficultywithpreciselymeasuring
the economic value of an innovation. While we
recognize that exploration and exploitation can
occur along any dimension of the business value
chain, we restrict our interests to technological
exploitation and exploration.Doing so allows us
to leverage a detailed data on new
pharmaceuticals development performance.
Fromthismore fine-graineddata setwe intend
to show as our conclusion that organizational
ambidexterity is also beneficial in terms of
exploratory innovation valuableness, and that
the optimal balance between exploitation and
exploration lies slightly toward exploitation.The
next section reviews preceding research and
provide theoretical underpinnings for our
arguments. Our sample and research methods
are discussed in a succeeding section. After
reporting our findings, the paper concludes with
some practical,as well as theoretical implications.
Theoretical Background
The Classic Trade-off between Exploitation and
Exploration
As is stylized by Holland (1975), and then
formalized by March (1991), the relationship
between exploitation and exploration is defined
as a trade-off. More precisely, exploitation is said
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are described to cyclically go through a period of
convergence and a period of upheaval. The period
of convergence is characterized by incremental
improvements on knowledge, technology, or on
organizational processes. The period of
convergence is also associated with increasingly
tighter coupling among decisions, actions, and
organizational structures (Siggelkow, 2001).
Whereas, the essence of this period is continuity,
it is suddenly punctuated with episodic upheavals,
or drastic reorientations (Tushman & Romanelli,
1985). The period of upheaval is full of drastic
changes based on unknown fields of knowledge.
Everything, including strategy, control systems,
and the distribution of power is redefined. This
redefinition undermines existing rules, standards,
and structures. Since the magnitude of substantial
changes is traumatic to organizational members,
managers’ heroic interventions are required to
push through the disruptive changes required
during the period of upheaval. In other words,
without such heroic interventions, drastic
reorientations and the resulting disruptive
changes that are generated are doomed to fail
due to organizational inertia. An organization is
always under the pressure to repeat familiar
procedures. Going beyond known fields requires
disrupting an otherwise congealed web of
mutually enhancing decisions, actions, and
organizational structures that result in predictable
behavioral results, enabling a firm to move into
areas where the results are unpredictable.
While these arguments focus on how to divide
exploitation and exploration either structurally
or temporally, proponents for contextual
ambidexterity argue organizations can be
ambidextrous not by dividing exploitation and
exploration, but by creating a unique
organizational context supportive of both (Gibson
& Birkinshaw, 2004). More specifically, under an
organizational context characterized by a
combination of stretch goals, discipline,
managerial support and trust, organizational
members belonging to a single organizational
unit exploit and explore at the same time. The
challenges of simultaneously pursuing
exploitation and exploration cannot be fully
attenuated even by this contextual ambidexterity.
However, this unique organizational context
empowers organizational members so they can
strive for organizational ambidexterity more
vigorously, by reducing concerns about the risks
of failure in meeting stretch goals.
Although these arguments are theoretically
sound and empirically verified, one critical
question has not been adequately answered.  We
are beginning to understand how to pursue both
An Emerging Perspective: Organizational
Ambidexterity
Although the trade-off relationship between
exploitation and exploration is well established,
recent research on organizational ambidexterity
has uncovered that not all organizations are the
victims of such a constrained either-or choice.
The central thesis of this research on
organizational ambidexterity contends that there
are some common antecedents for exploitation
and exploration irrespective of their ultimately
mutually contradicting nature. These researchers
start from the traditional assumption of the trade-
off relationship between exploitation and
exploration. However, they then try to identify
some managerial interventions (Tushman,
Anderson, & O’Reily, 1997), unique organizational
contexts (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004), or top
management team’s behavioral integration
(Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling, & Veiga, 2006) that
resolves this trade-off relationship. As such, the
burgeoning research on organizational
ambidexterity potentially shows how
organizations in general and global
pharmaceutical companies in particular might
both exploit the value of their libraries of existing
chemical entities, as well as explore novel NCEs
yet to be found.
One of the most familiar recommendations
on how to reconcile these dichotomous resource
allocation patterns is structural separation
(Christensen & Bower, 1996; Cooper & Smith, 1992;
Gilbert, 2005). Because exploitation and
exploration cannot be simultaneously pursued
in the same organization simultaneously, it is
suggested that organizational units geared toward
each of these activities should be separated. Based
on this understanding, these scholars indicated
that it is necessary to establish distinct
organizational units with different orientations,
i.e., one for exploitation (in most cases, an existing
organizational unit), and another for exploration
(again, in most cases a new organizational unit).
This argument has received considerable empirical
support (Afuah, 2001; Burgelman, 1983; McGrath,
2001; Puranam, Singh & Zollo, 2006; Rosenbloom
& Christensen, 1994).
Another approach to address the trade-off
relationship between exploitation and exploration
is to temporally separate them. One of the most
well known examples is the evolutionary pattern
called punctuated equilibrium (Eldredge & Gould,
1972; Gersick, 1991; Tushman, Anderson & O’Reily,
1997; Tushman, Newman & Romanelli, 1986;
Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). Seen from the
punctuated equilibrium perspective, organizations
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development because organizational
ambidexterity is defined as the ability to
“simultaneously create both incremental and
discontinuous innovation (Tushman & O’Reilly,
1997: 6).” Following this definition, prior studies
operationalize organizational characteristics of
ambidexterity by the extent to which firms
simultaneously pursue both exploratory and
exploitative product innovation (Benner &
Tushman, 2003; He & Wong, 2004).
The Japanese market for new pharmaceuticals
is quite appropriate for our purpose. All new
ethical drugs need to be approved by the
government (the Ministry of Health and Welfare),
and an official reimbursement price is approved
for each new pharmaceutical. This is quite
different from the North American market where
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approves
all new pharmaceuticals, but there is no standard
official price since each payer (i.e., insurance firms)
decides its own reimbursement price. Although
there are some other countries that use centralized
pricing authorities to set the reimbursement price
for pharmaceuticals, including Canada, France
and Spain, Japan is by far the largest market
among such countries, and hence most of global
pharmaceutical firms actively participate in the
Japanese market.
The second reason the Japanese new
pharmaceutical market is appropriate for our
study is that the official price for new ethical
drugs is determined according to its degree of
medical usefulness and effectiveness; which can
be used as a proxy measure of the new
pharmaceutical’s degree of economic value. A
pharmaceutical product is economically valuable
to the extent that it effectively cures a patient’s
illness. Since the government is the biggest payer
in Japan, new pharmaceutical’s degree of
economic value is primarily evaluated from the
perspective of public welfare, including the health
of the working population, containment of
national healthcare expenses, and national
prestige as an advanced nation. Pharmaceutical
firms are rewarded by higher reimbursement
prices to the extent that they fulfill their
responsibilities to enhance the public welfare.
Higher reimbursement price is also economically
valuable for pharmaceutical firms, since it benefits
them both directly (through higher revenue) and
indirectly (through reputation as being more
innovative).
The evaluation of medical valuableness is
reliable and precise because the government
delegates to independent specialists, including
physicians, scientists, payers, and pharmaceutical
firms the requirement to determine the improved
exploitation and exploration, but it is still not
clear what the optimal balance between
exploitation and exploration is or should be.
Should organizations pursue equal amount of
exploitation and exploration? If equal distribution
were not the answer, what would be the optimal
balance between them? The lack of understanding
on the optimal degree of organizational
ambidexterity is especially problematic for
practitioners when they try to manage their
organizations’ resource allocation. Without
knowing the optimal balance, managers have no
clue whether they should increase (decrease) or
decrease (increase) their resource allocation to
exploitative (exploratory) initiatives.
Another shortcoming of the extant empirical
work on organizational ambidexterity is that the
performance benefits of innovations are measured
in the more general terms of organizational
growth, while direct measures of an innovation’s
economic value are not. Although such
quantitative growth aspects, including sales
increase (He & Wong, 2004), growth in sales and
market share (Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling, & Veiga,
2006), profitability (Knott, 2002; Lubatkin, Simsek,
Ling, & Veiga, 2006), Tobin’s q (Wang & Li, 2008),
or perceived well-being in terms of general firm
performance (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004) are
important parts of performance benefits, these
reflect all the activities along the organization’s
value chain and have been used primarily because
they are readily available.  Measures of the direct
economic value of an innovation should also be
emphasized especially in the contexts of a firm’s
innovative behavior. For example, the aspect of
new economic value creation is often more
important in the context of product development.
Originally, exploitation and exploration entail
organizational learning and search (March, 1991).
Therefore, it is surprising that existing research
on organizational ambidexterity does not pay
closer attention to the new economic value
creation of an innovation. More generally, is
organizational ambidexterity beneficial for
generating new products with novel economic
value? We intend to address this theoretically, as
well as practically important question with a
unique dataset on new pharmaceutical
development in the Japanese market.
Methods
Sample
We address the question described above with
data from new pharmaceutical development in
the Japanese market. We focus on product
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includes additional information on these new
pharmaceuticals, such as the therapeutic area of
indication, drug type (internal, external, or
injection), approved reimbursement price, firms
who developed each pharmaceutical, and
application class. As for data on firms, we also
added information on whether each
pharmaceutical was developed by a single firm
or generated through some R&D alliances among
multiple firms. We were also able to include in
our database, cases where the pharmaceutical
gained orphan drug status1. 
All this information was available from
governmental public announcements on new
approvals. The database on new pharmaceutical
approval is paired with another database on each
firm’s pharmaceutical pipelines. Pipelines are
pharmaceutical candidates under development.
A professional medical magazine, called New
Current, has been publishing exhaustive lists of
pharmaceuticals under development since 1990.
Leveraging their lists, we gathered data on
pipelines at 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 for 98
firms listed on a new NCE pharmaceutical
approvals list. Since new pharmaceutical
development takes on average between 8-12
(Pisano & Rossi, 1994) or 7-11 (Powell, Koput, &
Smith-Doerr, 1996) years, we expect our pipeline
data covers most of those new pharmaceuticals
listed on 1999-2009 approvals2.
Variables and Analysis 
In order to understand the optimal degree of
organizational ambidexterity, we construct the
measure of organizational ambidexterity and test
its association with sample firms’ exploratory
innovation performance in terms of exploratory
degree of valuableness. The unit of analysis is
each new NCE pharmaceutical approved for
reimbursement.
Dependent variable (exploratory degree of
valuableness). Our dependent variable is each
new NCE pharmaceutical’s reimbursement price
standardized for one-day usage. Since the official
reimbursement price is set at the minimum units
of packaging (i.e., per pill, or per vial),
standardization for one-day usage is necessary
for fair comparability3.
This is the economic value of the innovation
or its exploratory degree of valuableness. Since
efficacy of the new pharmaceutical. This is a highly
rigorous and comprehensive measurement
process since these specialists make every possible
effort to fairly and consistently evaluate each new
pharmaceutical because the Japanese government
is concerned about balancing two competing
social welfare needs, i.e., containing
pharmaceutical costs and promoting
developments of effective pharmaceuticals. In
other words, reimbursement for non-innovative
pharmaceuticals should be tightly controlled,
while truly innovative ones should be
compensated for by a lucrative reimbursement
price.
The third reason we selected new
pharmaceutical development in the Japanese
market, is that the independent specialists also
determine which aspect of each new
pharmaceutical is evaluated as new. More
specifically, each newly developed pharmaceutical
is categorized into 9 application classes, including
NCE (new chemical entity), change in dosage,
change in delivery, change (or addition of)
indication, change in form, addition of form,
mixture of existing NCE, modified mixture, and
others. This classification is useful for our
operationalization, since the NCE classification
is traditionally thought to represent exploration
in the context of new pharmaceutical
development, while the other classifications are
thought to represent exploitation (Bierly &
Chakrabarti, 1996; Cardinal, 2001; Dunlap-Hinkler,
Kotabe, & Mudambi, 2010). An NCE represents a
totally new chemical entity that did not exist as
an ethical pharmaceutical drug. So finding a NCE
requires a search beyond known libraries of active
ingredients, while a non-NCE reuses NCEs already
approved for medical use. Consequently, the
measure we are using is a more direct measure
of the economic value of the innovation because
it does not include the distortion of other value
chain activities that exists in measures such as
sales, sales growth and profits or profit growth.
We constructed a database on new
pharmaceutical approvals from June 1999 to
March 2009 (excerpts of database entries are
shown in the appendix). During the 11 years, 259
new pharmaceuticals with new NCEs developed
by 99 firms were approved for reimbursement,
while 376 new pharmaceuticals reusing then-
existing NCEs were approved. Our database
1) Orphan drugs are those pharmaceuticals for very rare and serious diseases. Governments grant several preferential treatment including expedited approval and a higher
reimbursement price, so that pharmaceutical firms would be compensated for smaller market opportunities.
2) Since pipeline identifiers often change (usually from serial numbers to unique names) during development, it is extremely difficult to make sure an exact match between pipeline
data and approval data.
3) For example, the reimbursement price for Takeda’s diabetes drug, Actos (pioglitazone 
hydrochloride), was set at 119.2 yen per pill, and it’s allowed for 3 pills pre day. It gives us 357.6 (119.2*3) yen as Actos’s reimbursement price standardized for one-day usage.
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at 1995, 2000, and 2005, and averaged them for
each firm. Since pharmaceutical firms are
relatively consistent and do not drastically change
the level of R&D spending due to the fact that
pharmaceutical development is a multi-year
endeavor with cumulative effects of R&D
investment, we believe our measure reasonably
captures the substance of size variances among
the sampled firms. As is customary, the variable
is put in the model in natural logarithm (Greene,
2000; Long, 1997).
We also feel it necessary to control for whether
a firm is a biotech company, because
biotechnology is a competence-destroying
innovation (Nelson, 1994; Powell, Koput, & Smith-
Doerr, 1996), in that it is a new technological
regimen compared to the traditional chemical
based method of developing new pharmaceuticals
. Consequently, risk preference characteristics are
quite different between biotech firms and
traditional pharmaceutical firms, which should
affect the relationship between exploitation and
exploration.  
In addition to these control variables, several
dummy variables on each pharmaceutical’s
characteristics are included. First of all, whether
those NCE pharmaceuticals are developed as a
result of R&D alliances or not is included. An
alliance between pharmaceutical companies is
expected to positively affect innovative
performance, since allied firms are able to deploy
more resources, as well as to draw on diversified
sources of knowledge. Therefore, we include a
dummy variable that shows whether those NCE
pharmaceuticals are developed as a result of R&D
alliances or not.
Secondly, the NCE pharmaceutical’s therapeutic
area is expected to affect reimbursement price.
Specifically, those NCE pharmaceuticals with
indications of cancer or infectious diseases
generally are granted a higher reimbursement
price, because they have been Japan’s and the
World’s most fatal diseases respectively. Types of
NCE pharmaceuticals are also an important
consideration for setting reimbursement price.
Generally speaking, injection NCE pharmaceuticals
are expected to be more expensive, since they are
administered only by physicians, and thus could
contain stronger active ingredients5. Finally, those
NCE pharmaceuticals with orphan drug status
are also granted higher reimbursement prices so
that pharmaceutical firms are compensated for
the smaller market size. Overall, the availability
of data reduces our sample down to 231.
the Japanese economy had been under deflation
during most of our observation period, it was not
necessary to make any inflation adjustment on
the reimbursement prices. The distribution of this
variable is highly skewed, so we took the natural
logarithm of new NCE pharmaceutical’s
reimbursement price standardized for one-day
usage.
Independent variables. Our independent
variable measures each firm’s degree of
organizational ambidexterity in terms of their
development resource allocation to non-NCE as
well as NCE pipelines. Our measure of
organizational ambidexterity is defined as one
divided by |x - a|+0.001, where x is the total non-
NCE pharmaceutical pipeline counts of 1990, 1995,
2000, and 2005, divided by the total number of
pipelines (non-NCE as well as NCE) over the same
period. In our study, “a” denotes a threshold
balance between exploration and exploitation,
which divides over (under) and under (over)
exploitation (exploration). Consequently, |x - a|
indicates the degree of deviation from that
threshold for each firm. We take the reciprocal of
this value so that a higher measure indicates a
higher degree of organizational ambidexterity.
Since x equals a for some firms, we add 0.001 to
the denominator. Then, we vary the value of a to
see which sets of our independent variables with
differing threshold values show a significant
association with our dependent variable. The
threshold value with a significant positive
association with our dependent variable is
concluded to be an optimal degree of
organizational ambidexterity.
Control variables.We included several control
variables in order to control the effects of
alternative explanatory factors. More specifically,
we controlled for R&D spending, as well as
whether each firm is a biotech company or not
(dummy variable). In addition, several dummy
variables on each new pharmaceutical’s
characteristics are also included.
Preceding studies have found that the size of
an organization affects its innovative performance
(Camisón-Zornoza, Lapiedra-Alcamí, Segarra-
Ciprés, & Boronat-Navarro, 2004). When we
analyze product development performance at
pharmaceutical firms, R&D spending would be
the best measure for operationalizing size, because
it decides the number and the quality of
researchers firms can hire (Dunlap-Hinkler,
Kotabe, & Mudambi, 2010). We collected data on
R&D spending from Iyakuhin-kigyo Soran (A
Directly for Pharmaceutical Firms) and Datastream
Self-injection is not allowed in Japan, except for limited indications including diabetes.
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QIC (quasi-information criterion) are reported at
the bottom of the table, indicating how each
model with smaller QICs improves upon the base
model, which includes only control variables (Pan,
2001).
Model 1a and model 2a show the results with
the control variables only. Model 1b through 1j
and 2b through 2h add the independent variables.
Here, we discuss the results from models focused
on our main effects, i.e., model 1b through 1j for
Table 2, and model 2b through 2h for Table 3
respectively.
We first examine the coefficients for the degree
of organizational ambidexterity in model 1b
through 1j reported in Table 2. The significant (p
< .05) and positive coefficient is identified for the
case of a equals 0.1 (model 1b). Although
marginally, the significant (p < .10) and positive
coefficient is also found for the case of a equals
0.6 (model 1g). For other values of a, we fail to find
significant coefficients.
As for the control variables, most of them show
significant coefficients in the expected direction,
except for R&D spending and alliance. R&D
spending does not show significant coefficients.
As for the alliance variable, the results show a
negative and significant (p < .001) coefficient,
indicating alliances are used more for covering
each other’s weakness, rather than
Statistical Method
The data includes repeated observations for
the same firm. In order to account for
autocorrelation that may arise because each firm
is measured repeatedly across multiple times, we
employed the GEE (generalized estimating
equations) regression method (Liang & Zeger,
1986).
Descriptive statistics and correlations for all
the key variables are reported in table 1 for the
case of a equals 0.58 (which we found to be the
most significant results as we report below).
Overall, the independent and control variables
show considerable variance, and most correlations
among the variables range from small to
moderate. We also checked VIF (variance inflation
factors) for all variables in all models and none
of them exceeds 2, which indicates a very limited
threat of multicollinearity.
Results
Table 2 and 3 report the results of our analysis
on organizational ambidexterity and exploration
degree of valuableness. Specifically, Table 2 reports
the results for a between 0.1 and 0.9 with 0.1
increments, while Table 3 reports the results for
a between 0.52 and 0.64 with 0.02 increments.
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Reimbursement price a 8,19 2,51 
2. R&D spending a 11,07 1,44 ,09
3. Biotech 0,04 0,20 ,39 ** -,14 *
4. Alliances 0,17 0,38 -,38 ** -,29 ** -,10
5. Cancer indication 0,16 0,36 ,22 ** ,15 * -,03 -,07
6. Infectious disease
indication 0,25 0,43 ,17 ** ,02 -,02 -,18 ** -,25 **
7. Injection 0,36 0,48 ,67 ** -,01 ,24 ** -,25 ** ,08 ,03
8. Orphan drug 0,11 0,31 ,33 ** -,01 ,13 * -,12 ,08 ,09 ,18 **
9. Ambidexterity (a = 0.58) 4,85 7,20 ,09 -,05 ,01 -,08 -,03 ,11 ,06 -,05
"a natural logarithm
* p < .05  
** p < .01"
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations: a = 0.58 a 
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Model 1a 
(Base model)
Model 1b
(a = 0.1)
Model 1c 
(a = 0.2)
Model 1d
(a = 0.3)
Model 1e
(a = 0.4)
R&D spending b 0,10 (,08) 0,10 (,09) 0,10 (,08) 0,10 (,08) 0,10 (,08)
Biotech 2,98 ** (,92) 1,81 (1,15) 2,98 ** (,92) 2,98 ** (,92) 3,02 ** (,93)
Alliances -0,96 *** (,23) -0,96 *** (,23) -0,96 *** (,23) -0,96 *** (,23) -0,97 *** (,23)
Cancer indication 1,34 *** (,34) 1,37 *** (,33) 1,33 *** (,34) 1,34 *** (,33) 1,34 *** (,33)
Infectious disease
indication 0,96 *** (,23) 0,96 *** (,22) 0,95 *** (,23) 0,96 *** (,23) 0,96 *** (,23)
Injection 2,76 *** (,23) 2,73 *** (,23) 2,76 *** (,23) 2,76 *** (,23) 2,76 *** (,23)
Orphan drug 1,26 ** (,42) 1,32 *** (,39) 1,26 ** (,42) 1,26 ** (,42) 1,27 ** (,41)
Ambidexterity 0,00 * (,00) 0,00 (,00) 0,00 (,00) 0,00 (,00)
Constant 5,55 *** (,93) 5,54 *** (,94) 5,54 *** (,93) 5,55 *** (,92) 5,50 *** (,91)
QIC 155,152 539,939 555,444 555,769 555,201
Table 2 Results of GEE regression analysis for the effects of ambidextrous resource allocation on exploration
degree of valuableness a
Model 1f 
(a = 0.5)
Model 1g
(a = 0.6)
Model 1h 
(a = 0.7)
Model 1i
(a = 0.8)
Model 1j
(a = 0.9)
R&D spending b 0,11 (,08) 0,11 (,08) 0,11 (,08) 0,11 (,08) 0,11 (,08)
Biotech 2,88  ** (1,00) 2,95 ** (,96) 2,89 ** (,97) 2,92 ** (,98) 2,95 ** (,98)
Alliances -0,94 *** (,23) -0,91 *** (,23) -0,92 *** (,24) -0,91 *** (,24) -0,91 *** (,24)
Cancer indication 1,35 *** (,34) 1,34 *** (,34) 1,35 *** (,34) 1,35 *** (,34) 1,35 *** (,34)
Infectious disease
indication 0,97 *** (,23) 0,94 *** (,23) 0,98 *** (,23) 0,98 *** (,23) 0,98 *** (,23)
Injection 2,77 *** (,23) 2,77 *** (,23) 2,78 *** (,23) 2,78 *** (,23) 2,78 *** (,23)
Orphan drug 1,28 ** (,42) 1,31 ** (,41) 1,29 ** (,41) 1,30 ** (,41) 1,30 ** (,41)
Ambidexterity 0,00 (,00) 0,05 † (,03) 0,04 (,04) 0,18 (,15) 0,32 (,28)
Constant 5,46 *** (,93) 5,22 *** (,93) 5,30 *** (,93) 5,04 *** (,98) 4,89 *** (1,06)
QIC 554,271 553,013 554,710 554,699 555,012
"a n = 231 observations. Numbers in parentheses are standard
errors. Tow-tailed tests for all effects.b natural logarithm
† p < .1
* p < .05 
** p < .01
*** p < .001
58© 2011 Institute of Business Administration Journal of Business Chemistry 2011, 8 (2)
Osamu Suzuki and David Methé
Model 2a 
(Base model)
Model 2b
(a = 0.52)
Model 2c 
(a = 0.54)
Model 2d
(a = 0.56)
R&D spending b 0,10 (,08) 0,11 (,09) 0,11 (,09) 0,11 (,08)
Biotech 2,98 ** (,92) 2,96 
**
(,95) 2,98 ** (,92) 2,98 ** (,94)
Alliances -0,96 *** (,23) -0,94 *** (,24) -0,95 *** (,24) -0,93 *** (,23)
Cancer indication 1,34 *** (,34) 1,33 *** (,34) 1,34 *** (,34) 1,33 *** (,34)
Infectious disease
indication 0,96 *** (,23) 0,96 *** (,23) 0,95 *** (,23) 0,93 *** (,23)
Injection 2,76 *** (,23) 2,77 *** (,23) 2,77 *** (,23) 2,77 *** (,23)
Orphan drug 1,26 ** (,42) 1,28 ** (,42) 1,27 ** (,42) 1,29 ** (,42)
Ambidexterity 0,01 (,01) 0,00 (,00) 0,02 * (,01)
Constant 5,55 *** (,93) 5,44 *** (,96) 5,47 *** (,95) 5,53 *** (,93)
QIC 155,152 556,329 555,078 553,399
Table 3 Results of GEE regression analysis for the effects of ambidextrous resource allocation on exploration
degree of valuableness a
Model 2e 
(a = 0.58)
Model 2f
(a = 0.60)
Model 2g
(a = 0.62)
Model 2h
(a = 0.64)
R&D spending b 0,11 (,08) 0,11 (,08) 0,11 (,08) 0,11 (,08)
Biotech 2,99  ** (,94) 2,95 ** (,96) 2,91 ** (,98) 2,89 ** (,97)
Alliances -0,94 *** (,23) -0,91 *** (,23) -0,90 *** (,24) -0,91 *** (,24)
Cancer indication 1,33 *** (,34) 1,34 *** (,34) 1,34 *** (,34) 1,35 *** (,34)
Infectious disease
indication 0,93 *** (,23) 0,94 *** (,23) 0,96 *** (,23) 0,98 *** (,23)
Injection 2,75 *** (,23) 2,77 *** (,23) 2,78 *** (,23) 2,78 *** (,23)
Orphan drug 1,30 ** (,41) 1,31 ** (,41) 1,31 ** (,41) 1,30 ** (,41)
Ambidexterity 0,02 *** (,01) 0,05 † (,03) 0,05 (,04) 0,03 (,03)
Constant 5,39 *** (,92) 5,22 *** (,93) 5,18 *** (,94) 5,28 *** (,93)
QIC 552,319 553,013 553,579 554,409
"a n = 231 observations. Numbers in parentheses are standard
errors. Tow-tailed tests for all effects.b natural logarithm
† p < .1
* p < .05 
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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the latter approach is more aligned with our
notion of an ambidextrous organization, often
an incumbent firm in an industry. The balance is
subtle in that it indicates the importance of the
simultaneous pursuit of both exploitation and
exploration, while emphasizing that roughly 1.5
times more allocation to exploitative pipelines
than to exploratory ones is optimal. Whereas the
former approach of allocating 90 percent to
exploration is found to be beneficial in terms of
exploratory degree of valuableness, we doubt it
provides sufficient benefits in terms of efficient
short-term product developments with
exploitative nature and consequently could effect
an organizations short-term survival. This is often
the case with high technology start ups that must
rely on regular infusions of capital from venture
capitalists in order to survive until their
exploratory breakthrough product is developed
and marketed.  Therefore, we focus on the latter
approach and discuss some implications for
practitioners involved in pharmaceutical products
development in incumbent pharmaceutical
companies.
First of all, managers must pay close attention
to how many resources are allocated to non-NCE
pipelines when they try to develop more valuable
NCE pharmaceutical products. This is because
developing more valuable NCE pharmaceutical
products benefits from maintaining substantial
amount of non-NCE pipelines. This might sound
counter-intuitive, but there are some examples
that show this is in fact the case. For example, the
useful experience of later phase developments is
more frequently learned by being involved in
non-NCE pharmaceutical products development,
since NCE pipelines are more likely to fail in early
stages than are non-NCE pipelines. Thus the late
stage experience gained through having non-
NCEs can be applied to the NCEs that make it into
the latter stages of development.  In addition,
non-NCE products are more likely to generate
financial resources with a shorter lead-time, and
be more sustaining over time providing a more
munificent organizational milieu for NCE product
development. Off-course, excessive resource
allocation to exploitative pipelines will erode a
firms’ capability to generate blockbuster products.
Our finding on the critical threshold value of 0.56-
0.60 should help managers to discern whether
they should increase or decrease exploitative
resource allocation in order to remain on-course.
By providing this guideline we are making
explicit the rough rules of thump that managers
may have been tacitly making. However, given
the limits of our data we realize that these
numbers should be used with care. Since the
complementing each other’s strength. Other
control variables including biotech (p < .001),
cancer indication (p < .001), and infectious disease
indication (p < .001), injection (p < .001), and orphan
drug (p < .01) show significant and positive
coefficients as expected.
Model 2b through 2h in Table 3 report our tests
with a varying with smaller increments around
the value we found statistically significant. More
specifically, we vary a with 0.02 increments
between 0.52 and 0.64 to identify the optimal
degree of organizational ambidexterity in more
detail. The examination of coefficients for
organizational ambidexterity variables show that
significant and positive associations are identified
when a equals 0.56 (p < .05, model 2d), 0.58 (p <
.001, model 2e), as well as 0.60 (p < .10, model 2f).
For other values of a, we fail to find significant
coefficients. We also ran a similar analysis varying
a between 0.02 and 0.14, with 0.02 increments,
but found no significant and positive coefficients
except for the case of a equals 0.1 as reported
above (results are available from authors upon
request).
Discussion
We examined in this paper the important
research question, what is the optimal degree of
organizational ambidexterity. Our conclusion
from our analysis of new pharmaceutical products
development is that the optimal degree of
organizational ambidexterity is not necessarily
the even allocation of resources between
exploitation and exploration. The finding also
shows organizational ambidexterity is beneficial,
not only in terms of organizational growth as
measured by sales and other indirect measures,
but also more directly in terms of new value
creation represented in new product development.
We found that the optimal allocation in terms
of exploration degree of valuableness is achieved
when either 10 percent or 58-60 percent of
pipelines are exploitative or when they are either
90 percent or approximately 40 percent
exploratory. Interestingly enough, we find that
there are two distinct approaches to realize higher
exploration degree of valuableness through
organizational ambidexterity. The former
approach may be consistent with our conventional
image of the high technology organization and
in particular high technology start ups. Most
resources are dedicated to exploratory search, so
that radically novel innovation will be generated.
It is interesting to note that some exploitative
resource allocation is worthwhile even in this
type of organizational contexts. On the other hand,
product development cycle of the pharmaceutical
industry is long, ranging from 7-12 years, and takes
into account many steps, such as discovery,
preclinical and clinical testing and such, we are
not implying that the optimal ambidexterity level
should be maintained at 1.5 throughout the entire
process of development of a pharmaceutical drug.
Our results indicate that firms that have a
resultant mix of approximately 1.5 times
exploitative activities will have an optimal mix
of ambidexterity, which in turn will provide
greater resources for conducting their exploratory
product development activities.  
Secondly, managers need to address the trade-
off relationship between exploration frequency
and exploration valuableness. One of the most
obvious ways to increase the probability that
pharmaceutical firms could successfully develop
more NCE pharmaceutical products is to increase
the resources dedicated to the development of
NCE pipelines. However, increasing NCE pipelines
inevitably reduces non-NCE pipelines unless the
overall development budget is increased.
Therefore, given our finding that a predominantly
exploitative pipeline portfolio is positively
associated with more valuable NCE products,
there is a trade-off relationship between
exploration frequency and exploration
valuableness. By pursuing organizational
ambidexterity, managers are able to circumvent
the traditional trade-off relationship between
exploitation and exploration. However, even
ambidextrous organizations require sound
managerial decision-making on how to balance
exploration frequency and exploration
valuableness. Managers will need to consider the
idiosyncratic elements that are unique to each of
their individual firms, in order to make the
adjustment necessary to enhance their own
successful conversion rate between those chemical
entities beginning a pipeline and those resulting
in a new pharmaceutical drug.
In addition to these implications for
practitioners, our finding provides some
theoretical implications for future academic
research.
First of all, we show organizational
ambidexterity is beneficial for organizational
performance in terms of new value creation at
the level of the pharmaceutical drug. Prior works
on organizational ambidexterity predominantly
focused on less direct growth-oriented measures
like sales growth or profitability, mainly due to
the difficulty in operationalizing the degree of
valuableness of innovation in terms of each
product developed. By using a unique measure
of the more substantive aspects of the degree of
valuableness, we are able to observe the beneficial
effects of organizational ambidexterity in product
development. Product innovation activities are
only one sub-system, albeit an important sub-
system in the firm’s set of sub-systems that
comprise the overall value chain. Thus, we show
the value of innovation activities at the level of
the product, we do not address how well the firms
do in converting the higher value of each
innovation into higher firm value. Consequently,
we leave open the question of how well the
ambidextrous company does at generating value
at the overall level of the firm. This would be one
promising area for future research.  
Secondly, our study shows there is another
promising research direction to uncover the
determinants of optimal degree of organizational
ambidexterity. Our finding clarifies that there is
a distinction between beneficial and non-
beneficial ambidexterity, depending on the mix
of exploitation and exploration. The finding is
interesting in itself, but we were not able to
provide an explanation of how this optimal mix
is determined. We speculate that the degree of
environmental stability is one of the key
determinants, but an empirical verification is
beyond the scope of the current paper. One future
approach we could follow is to conduct a cross-
industry analysis. Considering the fact that the
pharmaceutical industry is one of the most quickly
changing industries due to its technology intensive
nature, we expect that the optimal mix of
exploitation and exploration should be more
skewed toward exploitation in the case of most
other industries classified as middle to low
technology industries.
Thirdly, another interesting research direction
indicated by our results is to consider why a
balance slightly skewed toward exploitation is
beneficial for new value creation. In other words,
it is necessary to understand how exploitation
could increase subsequent exploration’s degree
of valuableness. One plausible explanation is the
knowledge accumulated through incremental
refinements associated with non-NCE
pharmaceuticals development help in the
absorption of the new knowledge required for
NCE development (Suzuki & Methé, 2010).
Alternatively, it also might be possible to
emphasize the underlying organizational
dynamism, designed in the exploitative innovation
process, i.e., such disciplines as formalization or
milestone management that an organization
exercises when they allocate very limited
resources to exploratory initiatives. Specifically,
the use of rigorous milestone or deadline
management is reported to discipline the
Osamu Suzuki and David Methé
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otherwise haphazard process of exploration
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Gersick & Hackman,
1990). Further, the distinct definition of roles and
responsibilities also makes rather chaotic intra-
organizational interactions accompanying
exploration more manageable (Sine, Mitsuhashi
& Kirsch, 2006). Even bureaucracy, so often
infamously portrayed as antagonist towards
innovative spirits, has been shown to be
instrumental in facilitating employees in the
learning process, thus facilitating exploration
under certain conditions (Adler & Borys, 1996).
Irrespective of all these contributions, our paper
is not free from limitations, which open up further
opportunities for future research. First of all, our
results might have been strongly affected by the
pharmaceutical industry’s knowledge-intensive
nature. If other more capital-intensive and less
knowledge-intensive or moderate to low
technology intensive industries are studied, the
association between exploitative resource
allocation patterns and subsequent exploratory
innovation performance could be weaker. Thus,
a cross industrial study would be an interesting
avenue for future research. In addition, our
research focuses on only one aspect of exploratory
innovation. Although we feel it important to
clarify hitherto neglected performance benefits
in terms of exploration degree of valuableness,
whether organizations should pursue
ambidexterity or not depends on overall
performance benefits in terms of both value
creation and growth. Future research should take
these two distinct aspects into consideration when
performance benefits earned from organizational
ambidexterity are examined.  This could be
accomplished by mixing the traditional measures
of sales and profit with more direct measures of
an innovations economic value. Thirdly, our
independent variable on the degree of
organizational ambidexterity measures a firm’s
resource allocation only indirectly. Ideally
speaking, the amount of resources allocated to
non-NCE and NCE products development could
be measured in terms of monetary amounts. Such
an analysis with more precise data tying the
financial resources directly to NCE and non-NCE
development, would most likely show a more
substantial skew toward exploitative resource
allocation, since non-NCE developments are more
likely to survive until the later and more costly
development stages. Finally, our research has
examined how firms conduct product
development activities in markets in a developed
economy characterized with centralized pricing
authorities. It would be valuable to conduct this
type of study in markets where the pricing
authority is less centralized. And in an economy
which is still in the process of developing its
institutional infrastructure, such as intellectual
property rights (IPR).
Research on organizational ambidexterity
generates the opportunity to reinterpret the long-
established dichotomous relationship between
exploitation and exploration. Yet, its potential is
barely appreciated by practitioners due to the
obvious lack of clear guidelines for applying the
findings’ implications to actual managerial
practices. It also is unfortunate that the lack of
appropriate measures on the consequential
benefits of ambidexterity hinders its appreciation
by managers involved in new product
developments. We hope our study will stimulate
practical, as well as scholarly discussions on how
to leverage the findings on organizational
ambidexterity for the creation of novel value.
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